This is a paper I wrote for my Philosophy of Aesthetics class concerning Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment.
First, it will be important to cover the grounds which will be used to discuss the similarities between Kant's system and the evolutionary system. Kant discusses the system of nature as a system in which organised systems (organisms) behave in a fashion that is different from non-living systems: they seem to be formed purposefully, as if they had a goal in their design and behaviour. (p.233-234, Kant) Kant relinquishes this teleological judgment as reflective-- the particular concept is given and the universal has to be found from it. In this vein, Kant sets living systems at the center of his natural system. (p.233-234 Kant) Natural selection, on the other hand, while putting perhaps more emphasis on the organisms themselves, also sets importance to the environment in which they are placed. It will be made clear when covering the purposiveness of nature how it impacts the nature of our teleological judgments.
Kant posits an antimony between the explanatory power of mechanical laws and its limits, in view that it did not seem possible at the time to explain the emergence of living from non-living matter. Part of Kant's solution is based in the claim that both principles are regulative and not constitutive, they do not state how nature really is, but presents principles of investigation of nature. This is due to peculiarities in human cognition. "discursive" understanding contrasts with "intuitive" understanding. We intuitively understand that the production of organisms is impossible without teleological causation. The only possible resolution would be "subordinate" mechanism to teleology. Higher species come from lower species, but it would be impossible for lower species to come from unorganized matter. That point where we lack a mechanistic explanation, we let go to teleology, becoming the starting point for our investigation. Alway s in the case of organisms, the "mechanism" depends on living matter, whose possibility we can understand only in teleological terms.
With the venue of natural selection and the genetical system at its foundation, it has become possible to begin to settle this antimony by understanding the automation involved in biological organisms (that is, systems of DNA, rNA and epigenetics). While we do not know exactly how it has come to be, the answer is already clear enough to see that it is more than "because it was its goal to." Dawkins explains this eloquently when he says, "Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is satisfying because it shows us a way in which simplicity could change into complexity, how unordered atoms could group themselves into ever more complex patterns until they ended up manufacturing people." (p.12, Dawkins)
One more point that we should be wary of is that of language. Daniel Denett, a prominent philosopher and biologist, explains in his paper "The Intentional Stance" that it is possible to speak of a system in terms of intentionality without actually referring to an intentionality in the system itself. He uses the example of a chess computer which would appear to act as though it were working toward a certain goal (i.e. moving into a checkmate and so on), even though we are fully aware that a computer chess does not in fact follow such teleological trains of thought. (Dennett, "The Intentional Stance") It remains possible to speak of a system with the language we use for our own intentionality when the object itself behaves as if it were designed. This is seen in natural systems, since the selection portion of the system makes the objects within the system seem to be designed toward a certain goal-- that is, survival. It is important to notice that this abstraction of language does not render the concepts subjective. They rather translate the objective character of the mechanics so as only to speak of their function in terms of purposiveness (or intentionality, in Denett's case.)
It is important to bring a historical light to his issue to understand where the first ideas of natural selection came into being and how they could have influenced Kant. Kant lived approximately fifty years after the Compte de Buffon (one of Charles Darwin's inspirations) and Maupertuis (who did research on heredity), considered to be ones of the first pioneers in terms of the natural selection theory, before Charles Darwin concretised it after Kant's death. It is not completely inconsistent to see that Kant did not exist in a complete vacuum of philosophical thought, but was also influenced by the various currents of his times.
Therefore, it should become easier from here on out to analyse the theories and imagine how Kant's organisms are mirrored in the organisms that genes have formed in the theory of natural selection, and to see their roles (and mechanisms) as part of Kant's apparent purposiveness of nature.
Kant posits an antimony between the explanatory power of mechanical laws and its limits, in view that it did not seem possible at the time to explain the emergence of living from non-living matter. Part of Kant's solution is based in the claim that both principles are regulative and not constitutive, they do not state how nature really is, but presents principles of investigation of nature. This is due to peculiarities in human cognition. "discursive" understanding contrasts with "intuitive" understanding. We intuitively understand that the production of organisms is impossible without teleological causation. The only possible resolution would be "subordinate" mechanism to teleology. Higher species come from lower species, but it would be impossible for lower species to come from unorganized matter. That point where we lack a mechanistic explanation, we let go to teleology, becoming the starting point for our investigation. Alway s in the case of organisms, the "mechanism" depends on living matter, whose possibility we can understand only in teleological terms.
With the venue of natural selection and the genetical system at its foundation, it has become possible to begin to settle this antimony by understanding the automation involved in biological organisms (that is, systems of DNA, rNA and epigenetics). While we do not know exactly how it has come to be, the answer is already clear enough to see that it is more than "because it was its goal to." Dawkins explains this eloquently when he says, "Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is satisfying because it shows us a way in which simplicity could change into complexity, how unordered atoms could group themselves into ever more complex patterns until they ended up manufacturing people." (p.12, Dawkins)
One more point that we should be wary of is that of language. Daniel Denett, a prominent philosopher and biologist, explains in his paper "The Intentional Stance" that it is possible to speak of a system in terms of intentionality without actually referring to an intentionality in the system itself. He uses the example of a chess computer which would appear to act as though it were working toward a certain goal (i.e. moving into a checkmate and so on), even though we are fully aware that a computer chess does not in fact follow such teleological trains of thought. (Dennett, "The Intentional Stance") It remains possible to speak of a system with the language we use for our own intentionality when the object itself behaves as if it were designed. This is seen in natural systems, since the selection portion of the system makes the objects within the system seem to be designed toward a certain goal-- that is, survival. It is important to notice that this abstraction of language does not render the concepts subjective. They rather translate the objective character of the mechanics so as only to speak of their function in terms of purposiveness (or intentionality, in Denett's case.)
It is important to bring a historical light to his issue to understand where the first ideas of natural selection came into being and how they could have influenced Kant. Kant lived approximately fifty years after the Compte de Buffon (one of Charles Darwin's inspirations) and Maupertuis (who did research on heredity), considered to be ones of the first pioneers in terms of the natural selection theory, before Charles Darwin concretised it after Kant's death. It is not completely inconsistent to see that Kant did not exist in a complete vacuum of philosophical thought, but was also influenced by the various currents of his times.
Therefore, it should become easier from here on out to analyse the theories and imagine how Kant's organisms are mirrored in the organisms that genes have formed in the theory of natural selection, and to see their roles (and mechanisms) as part of Kant's apparent purposiveness of nature.
Kant makes a distinction between two sorts of purposiveness: formal and material. The formal purposiveness is the conceptual type. If we are to imagine a circle and ground it in our mind in an arbitrary space and from there deduce the limits and "laws" that are enclosed in it, we are merely dealing with an unreal concept which we use to ground other material (empirical) concepts. This concept shows us how a priori knowledge about the world points to us a certain purposiveness to nature. (p.236, Kant) This has important ramifications for such things as rationality and subjectivity. If all humans are able to see these laws in circles, then surely there must be some objective ground for supposing so. A possible solution to this problem comes from Daniel Dennett's paper "Rational Systems" in which he explains that any rational system evolving through a system of natural selection must always be selecting individual systems which reinforce a certain mirroring of the external world. Such a system would ensure that the organism has a "true" representation of the world, at least as far as it fulfills its needs. (Daniel Dennett, "Rational Systems") From this, it would seem that this a priori knowledge shown through conceptual judgments is necessary for any complex enough organism, and would root the claim of objectivity in these particular instances.
Kant had also reached the same conclusion, but had been settled in terms of self-evidence in the following passage,
Kant believes that the principle of nature's purposiveness are based on nature's empirical lawlikeness (mirrored in the formal lawlikeness). If the objects of nature are conceptualizable, then those empirical regularities must be recognized as law-like, and falling into a systematic hierarchy. This systematic hierarchy seems to fit the concept of biological evolution. The system of natural selection realizes organisms that have the effect of seeming to be designed, to have a purposiveness that is causal to their existence, since another "design" would select them out of nature, leaving only the organisms that fit into nature's unified system.
Kant further speaks of the question of possibility by saying, "But the purposiveness still does not make the concept of the object itself possible, i.e., it is not regarded as possible merely with respect to this use." (p.235, Kant) Kant believes that the reflecting judgment is anchored in the fact that we cannot judge the possibility of the objects of nature through teleological judgments. The same remains true for certain judgments in the evolutionary view, though at a different degree. With the knowledge gained from the contemporary paradigm, we have a much more precise knowledge of the possibilities of the organisms' forms, and to judge the likeness of each. The coupling of certain genes could help an organism' survival and maintain its species for a longer amount of time. (Dawkins, p.88) Such judgments come into account when judging the likelihood of certain types of natural organisms to a degree that moves a large set of possibilities into the determining realm. Of course, certain possibilities remain out of our grasp and rely still on our reflective judgments.
The position of man within this system has been set by Kant as the ultimate recipient of the "purpose of nature" (or its ultimate end). Kant saw man as being outside of this system of nature and the purpose of it since man is the only being which is able to freely choose its own end (he is able to understand the morality of his own actions outside of his own impulses.) When it comes to evolutionary theory, we see that man only becomes one end of a self-conscious spectrum in which other animals may also have claim. There are primates who exhibit complex social structures and mores that could indicate complex thought on par with the sort of moral thought humans are able to cognate. As for the final end of nature, the inner purposiveness of nature itself, natural selection allows us to see it much more clearly through evolutionary pressures in the system, allowing for the emergence of social mores and sympathy, to see that its own inner purposiveness is based on the survival of types of organisms.
Kant had also reached the same conclusion, but had been settled in terms of self-evidence in the following passage,
"All geometrical figures that are drawn in accordance with a principle may display a manifold and often admired objective purposiveness, namely that of serviceability for the solution of many problems in accordance with a single principle, and indeed of each of them in infinitely many different ways. The purposiveness here is evidently objective and intellectual, not, however, merely subjective and aesthetic. For it expresses the suitability of the figure for the generations of many shapes aimed at purposes, and is cognized through reason." (p. 235, Kant)
Kant believes that the principle of nature's purposiveness are based on nature's empirical lawlikeness (mirrored in the formal lawlikeness). If the objects of nature are conceptualizable, then those empirical regularities must be recognized as law-like, and falling into a systematic hierarchy. This systematic hierarchy seems to fit the concept of biological evolution. The system of natural selection realizes organisms that have the effect of seeming to be designed, to have a purposiveness that is causal to their existence, since another "design" would select them out of nature, leaving only the organisms that fit into nature's unified system.Kant further speaks of the question of possibility by saying, "But the purposiveness still does not make the concept of the object itself possible, i.e., it is not regarded as possible merely with respect to this use." (p.235, Kant) Kant believes that the reflecting judgment is anchored in the fact that we cannot judge the possibility of the objects of nature through teleological judgments. The same remains true for certain judgments in the evolutionary view, though at a different degree. With the knowledge gained from the contemporary paradigm, we have a much more precise knowledge of the possibilities of the organisms' forms, and to judge the likeness of each. The coupling of certain genes could help an organism' survival and maintain its species for a longer amount of time. (Dawkins, p.88) Such judgments come into account when judging the likelihood of certain types of natural organisms to a degree that moves a large set of possibilities into the determining realm. Of course, certain possibilities remain out of our grasp and rely still on our reflective judgments.
The position of man within this system has been set by Kant as the ultimate recipient of the "purpose of nature" (or its ultimate end). Kant saw man as being outside of this system of nature and the purpose of it since man is the only being which is able to freely choose its own end (he is able to understand the morality of his own actions outside of his own impulses.) When it comes to evolutionary theory, we see that man only becomes one end of a self-conscious spectrum in which other animals may also have claim. There are primates who exhibit complex social structures and mores that could indicate complex thought on par with the sort of moral thought humans are able to cognate. As for the final end of nature, the inner purposiveness of nature itself, natural selection allows us to see it much more clearly through evolutionary pressures in the system, allowing for the emergence of social mores and sympathy, to see that its own inner purposiveness is based on the survival of types of organisms.
In conclusion, this paper has set the ground for a framework in which we are able to reconcile Kant's view of the system of nature to the explanatory power of evolution by natural selection. As Kant believed, humans have the potential to freely choose their ends, and as such, it becomes imperative to understand which we choose, as our knowledge of biology augments to the point where we become the designers of nature, and the organisms within it.
Works Cited
1. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Print.
2. Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene (The 30th Anniversary Collection). Oxford University Press, 2006.
3. Dennett, Daniel. "The Intentional Stance". Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1987.
4. Dennett, Daniel. Brainstorms: philosophical essays on Mind and Psychology. "Rational Systems." Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1981.
2. Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene (The 30th Anniversary Collection). Oxford University Press, 2006.
3. Dennett, Daniel. "The Intentional Stance". Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1987.
4. Dennett, Daniel. Brainstorms: philosophical essays on Mind and Psychology. "Rational Systems." Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1981.
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