| How do you account for the fact that consciousness is also relative to the motion of the brain? An astronaut going many times faster relative to us would be thinking as fast as us subjectively, but when comparing from our motions relative to each other, we are the ones thinking quite faster, since time is slower for the astronaut. If our mind is detached from the physical world, how come the astronaut doesn't think much slower than we do? |
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In the essay A New Look at the Immutability of God by Clarke Norris found in God-Person-Being, Norris attempts to consolidate the Thomistic position with the exigencies of a Relational (or Personal) God. He depicts God as having an intentional consciousness in which he can relate to us in a significant fashion while still retaining the immutability predicted by his perfection. He carries this argument by building from the Thomistic position and its arguments, and then shows us in a new light the foundation of these ideas. He shows us that God’s needed mutability must be rooted in an intentional relation, and then explains the contingent aspect of this relational consciousness. The last remaining topics needed to understand the relation are the mechanics of our temporal relationship and how we can affect God in order to have a significant relationship.
The Thomistic Position
The traditional natural theology depicts God as unconditionally immutable. He would have no relation to the world as it pertains to his own real being (i.e. his reality). The only possible relation with God and our reality is a "relation of reason". This idea clearly conflicts with the exigencies of the God of personal relation in which he would affect the world in real fashion. The Thomistic position being rejected, people turned toward process philosophy and the existential religious consciousness to try and develop on the belief that true relations would make a difference to him.
Arguments against the Thomistic Position
There are two main arguments against the Thomistic position concerning the immutability of God and the absence of any real relation on God's part toward the world: Process Philosophy and the Existential Religious Consciousness.
Process philosophy explores the possible necessities of a reality in which God is immutable. The author portrays God has having two natures. There is the Primordial Nature which is immutable and infinite and there is the Consequent Nature, which is a relation of knowledge and intent. This changing and growing nature is mutable, finite and truly related.
The second argument tries to come with an intellectual system to explain our own being, as existential religious consciousness. It tries to understand how it is that I am here and aware, and how God is affecting this system. it is the consequent nature of God, as mutable and related, that God affects our reality. This nature will be looked into more deeply during the rest of the essay.
Mutability
The concept of the restriction of mutability in God for him to develop real relations has been long debated. The central notion of absolute or infinite perfection is that immutability is necessarily involved in perfection. St-Thomas resolves this issue by going back to real change. For real change to exist it would need a passage from potency to act and it would require an extrinsic cause. Any acquisitions of new modes of being would entail an increase of its ontological perfection. Real relation must be founded in something in the intrinsic real or absolute being of that which is related. It is not clear if it is even needed that he should increase the number of “perfection attributes” he possesses in order to do have this real relation.
The author finds the mutability in the expression of his intent. It is constantly growing and responds to our own expressions with him. Of course, the field of his consciousness would be contingently other because of his personal relations with us.
"This determinate differentiation is in the order of intentional being or object focus, the being of the other as held within consciousness." (189)
God, as a real being, does not pass from potency to act. What is seen here is that of efficient causality, located in the effect and not in the causal agent, in this case God. Change is the opposite, it is enriching oneself. This tells us three things: There is nothing new in the recipient, the first is the cause of the second and that the former, in itself, needs intent on the latter. The last corollary is too seldom omitted and fails to realize that a real relation with God is then defined by an intrinsic change in the real being of God. We see no such thing in the intentional consciousness model. There is then no reason for affirming that there is any real mutability in God. We still need to explore the specific consequences of an "intentional relationship".
Process in the Divine Consciousness and Relation with Reality
According to St-Thomas, there are two modes of being. There is the self-existence of a being and there is the mode of being as a knowledge-object inside an intentional being's consciousness. The second mode requires that the knowledge object be of a real other, even as present in the knower's mind as an intentional representation. In the case of God, he would have knowledge of a real world that is other than himself. As such, an object of knowledge is not real in itself; it exists entirely inside the consciousness of the knower. We then see a multiplicity of these objects of knowledge, but they do not introduce change in the real being of the knower. The author realizes the immaterialism of God by saying, "A spiritual knower can know a material object, without its own real being or its real act of knowing being material." (193)
If we turn to the intentional being, we can see that there would be two possible sources of knowledge of any object. Either the real object, as other, acts on the knower or the knower forms the object within his own consciousness. The object knowledge of God would then be formed in the latter fashion. Although, this raises the fear that our free actions would then be totally determined by God, we need to remember that God's intentional consciousness necessarily contains the whole multiplicity of all creatures in their unique individuality and distinctness. God could also have decided to make the world in some other way.
The relationship of God would be true, in the sense that it is a significant change in our world. The term 'real' excludes this basis of change because of the terminology pushed by classical theories in the past and setting up a system that did not fit the currently proposed framework. In this relation, we have yet to figure out how he comes about these changes, the order of the relationship with us as beings in time.
Temporal Succession in God
We have come to the understanding that God's real expression and his response to us take place in time, but it must be pointed out that a change in time does not necessarily put change in his being. The author shows us qualities he imparts on the divine consciousness: Every knowable object is represented in God's intentional consciousness and part of their intelligibility is their sequence in time, and for God to be truly in time, there would need some real change in the "Cognitive Sequence" in God (or its objective content).
There is no real succession in God, only the relative times between objects in God’s consciousness in the order of intentional being. A sequence itself cannot be called a temporal succession of states since no real change underlies it. The fear rises again that there is a predetermined eternity in which God pre-knows all, restraining our free will. The author asserts that God learns of our free actions at the same time we do in his eternal being.
There are two possible models for the intentional consciousness of God. The classical model in which there is a durationless eternity where "Single simultaneous vision where all points of the temporal process are equally simultaneous to God" (202) and the durational model, where God’s intentional consciousness meets time’s constant evolution as it develops. In this latter model, there is no real change in the Aristotlean sense and therefore would keep his perfection. This model has been popularly rebuked since Einstein's Relativity Theory renders meaningless the idea of a time frame for God. It might be that this intentional conscious is so far from our perspective that we must keep both theories as viable until we can say more about it. One puzzle any model must solve is the mechanisms for God to receive knowledge from us.
How Can God Receive from Us in the Order of Knowledge?
From the Judeo-Christian point of view, a person must be the cause of his own actions. There are two ways to realize this: The object known affects the passive knower or a superior agent shares a part of his powers with a lower agent. The author shows that our actions come from a combination of our free will with the causative power of God by giving ourselves the ability to abscond the act from potency, letting the only positive intent left for God's causative power to bring into action. God then knows the intent of our free actions and impresses on our own will to bring it to reality. It is an exclusion of all other actions that renders this one active. This receptivity opposes an imperfect passivity and reflects pure perfection on the highest level of personal being.
Conclusion
The author explains how God is able to have a personal relationship with our own world by pushing his intentional consciousness toward our willing actions. He shows us that this intentional consciousness is mutable, but does not change his real immutable being, thus presenting his intended theory that God can have perfection and can still hold personal relationships. What still needs to be looked at is how the premise of an intentional consciousness can be held.
It would seem at first glance that the author of the article has given a fair statement as to the possibility of an intentional consciousness in God’s real being. He bases his idea on the fact that God’s mutable aspect is contained in a way in which it stops being “real”, where any change in the mutable aspect of God requires no change in his real being. He then uses this mutable aspect, contained in the intentional consciousness, to affect the world in which we live, which is also indisputably real. It is clear that the author wants to coalesce a personal relation with perfection in a single being (namely, God). In order to do this, he proposes the intentional consciousness as a mutable system inside the immutable system of God. He tries to get away without explaining the basis for such a system by likening it to our own mind, where we could think about objects that we have knowledge of, but carry no change inside our own beings. It is not clear whether it does indeed carry no change inside our being, as the psychosomatic link is anything but clear. Even in the event where we could qualify our conscious knowledge-object inside our minds as an unreal object, it is not clear how a knowledge-object located in a consciousness could carry a change in the real world. If I represent in my mind a raging fire located in front of me, how does my intent of subduing the knowledge-object of fire actually carry out any change in the fire located in front of me? There are many unresolved questions still hanging in the premises of the article.
The author also raises the question of terminology by redefining the term “real“ as something that is significant (For example, a significant relation, even if not defined by the classical philosophers as “real” would definitely be considered “real” by the author.) If the intentional consciousness were to carry real change in our world, how can we say that it is anything but existing? According to the article To Be Is to Be Substance-in-Relation by the same author in the same book, a substance is both what it is in itself and the relation it carries with other substances. If the intentional consciousness is said to have relations with our own world, then it must be an integral part of what the being is in fact.
In which case we are faced with two choices: Either the intentional consciousness is God and therefore God is mutable, or the intentional consciousness is a being different than God and therefore God keeps his perfection, but loses the personal relation the Judeo-Christian doctrine imposes on him.
ABSTRACT
In this paper, the goal is to inspect the possible philosophical implications of a mind modeled as a machine. It is important to first look at the possible models of the machines. I achieve this by first looking at the early history of the field of Artificial Intelligence, looking at discrepancies between mind and machines. I then proceed to explain the need for such a philosophy, immediately followed by a look at the philosophical repercussions in the domains of free will in simulated minds and ethics in the case of both simulated and emulated brains. By the end of the paper, we should have a concise idea of what a simulated mind should entail.
I. Introduction
II. The Mind Modeled As A Machine
a. Early History
b. Modeling The Mind
III. Philosophical Implications
a. The need for a Philosophical Basis
b. Free Will and Deterministic Machines
c. Ethical Implications of Emulations and Simulations
IV. Conclusion
I. Introduction
Ever since we have discovered the power of computational machines, we have imagined the possibilities of using this power to leverage the human mind. In a short span of time, this technology has been ingrained so deeply into our everyday life that it would be virtually unthinkable to get rid of it today. To have access to events, to people, to information from all over the world in a single second has become second nature to even the most amateur of technophiles. It is a world of possibilities where we use the information available to us as an extension of our own minds. What happens when we try to emulate our minds inside the machines? What happens when we let go of our own organic bodies and let our mind reside inside our own creation? There are many possibilities, and all of them are exciting. I will first cover in this paper the steps taken to show the distinctions and relatedness between mind and machine, mainly the history of the field of Artificial Intelligence and some theories as to how it could be implemented. I will then cover the philosophical implications of such a technology, such as free will, and the ethical implications of virtualizations.
II. The Mind Modeled as a Machine
a. Early History
As soon as the idea of the first computer emerged, men came about and noticed the possibilities. One man stood out from the pack by extrapolating from this idea. Alan Turing (1912 – 1954), a British mathematician, thought about a special kind of machine, which he called a universal machine. This fictional machine would have the capability of taking any instruction from 'an instruction table' (remember, this was before they even made computers. The concept of programming was barely in its cradle.) and use it himself to output his data, no matter what the instruction table is. He then went further ahead and developed the idea that given enough space and time, we could even reproduce the 'instruction table' of the human mind inside of the universal machine in such a way that the output of this machine would be indistinguishable from a typical human mind.
Turing used the idea of his universal machine to devise a test in which it would be possible to tell whether a machine had achieved a human-level of consciousness. The Turing Test is relatively simple. If a machine can deceive a human into thinking that it is human by talking to him through a teleprompter (or any kind of non-physical conversation), he can be said to possess human-level consciousness. There are many who oppose the test, but the main argument behind the test is given by Turing himself,
"According to the most extreme form of this view the only way by which one could be sure that a machine thinks is to be the machine and to feel oneself thinking. One could then describe these feelings to the world, but of course no one would be justified in taking any notice. Likewise according to this view the only way to know that a man thinks is to be that particular man. It is in fact the solipsist point of view. It may be the most logical view to hold but it makes communication of ideas difficult. A is liable to believe 'A thinks but B does not' whilst B believes 'B thinks but A does not'. Instead of arguing continually over this point it is usual to have the polite convention that everyone thinks." (1936)
From this point on, the idea that the mind could be seen as a complex machine started out. With the development of computational power and complexity, we have arrived at a point where machines themselves are helping us to figure out what it means to be human, with their immense help in the fields of Medicine, Biology, Chemistry and Physics. We are only now starting to understand how our own bodies are built and how we can build on these lessons to provide a better future for ourselves.
b. Modeling the Mind
In order to create a virtual mind, we are presented with two choices. We can either emulate or simulate the pattern of connections located inside the brain which give rise to our consciousness.
In emulation, the goal is to recreate the exact patterns of the brain, so that the same reactions occur in the same places. We are in effect trying to recreate a 1 to 1 scale of the human brain, to a precise enough resolution so as to also give rise to consciousness. We will always expect for there to be noise or other kinds of interference, but an emulation assumes that the brain that we are emulating would react in the same manner were it be affected by those same interferences.
In order to emulate the brain, the method that most people would accept as the most simple and most accessible would be to scan an existing brain and recreate it virtually. Such scans are almost within reach, using Magnetic Resonance Imaging at a somewhat higher resolution. We would also need enough computing power to emulate the entire brain, which we do not possess at this moment. Such a process was looked into with a little bit more detail by Goertzel and Bugaj in their book 'The Path to Posthumanism'.
"There are thought to be around 1010 neurons in the brain, and 1033-1015 synapses connecting them. According to this, if
In the case of simulation, our goal would be to create the algorithms portrayed by the brain patterns, so that the overall effects remain the same. For example, if we were trying to simulate the optical area of the brain, we would not need to simulate a retina attached to optic nerves; we could simply attach a camera and transform the resulting data into a format accepted by these optic nerves. The camera would effectively simulate an eye. In order to recreate an intelligent mind, it might not be necessary to recreate the entire human brain. The human brain takes care of many more things than simply the mind or its intelligence. Jeff Hawkins, the founder of Palm Computing, has delved on the origin of human intelligence in his book 'On Intelligence'. He advances the idea that what is needed to create an intelligent being like a human is a neocortex, the thin, outer layer of our brain. Of course, the rest of the brain is needed to support this neocortex, but when we learn the algorithms behind the model, we can learn how to build one without the need for the biological support. After all, in a virtual environment, there is no reason for the created mind to obey the same constraining laws we have in our own mortal state.
Jeff Hawkins sets up the neocortex as a system of biofeedback in which neurons receive input from sensory organs and are able to "call back" those inputs in a series of hierarchal ordered layers which we perceive as our imagination and thought. This gives rise to self-reflection and a self-reliant process of possible reorganization of these layers. In order to reproduce this effect, we would not need to recreate the thirty billion cells of our neocortex and their interactions. We could simply recreate the hierarchical system that the neocortex implements.
It may not be possible at this stage to know when and how the simulation of our brains will be possible, but it seems to definitely be on our horizon. With these capabilities comes a re-affirmation of what it means to be human, and what it means to be intelligent.
III. Philosophical Implications
a. The need for a Philosophical basis
Were I to create a virtual brain inside my computer, where this virtual brain residing in a virtual body would observe virtual objects located inside a virtual world, would this virtual person have the same “amount of reality” as a person standing in front of the box observing it? The virtual person would probably believe that the reality it perceives is, to all intents and purposes, the "real" reality. We perceive here the opposite of the "Matrix effect" in which it is not the "upper" reality that is considered more real, they are both equally real, but relative to the observer. Now, what if the virtual brain inside the computer was actually my own uploaded brain? Would it receive humane treatment because it has human memories? A lot of new questions as to the epistemological basis for reality are raised. That is why a need for a philosophy based on the mind modeled as a machine is imperative if we are to break into this new age of intelligence enhancement. It is not the purpose of this paper to dig deeper into the subject, it is simply to raise consciousness to possible contradictions within the more classical philosophical trends.
b. Free Will and Deterministic Machines
Up until now, we have only created machines that are deterministic in essence, meaning that for the exact same input, the machine will output exactly the same result. Some people have taken this view and rejected the idea of the mind modeled as a machine because we are believed to possess free will. I will attempt to show in this section that this need not be the case, the virtualization of a mind does not necessarily render it deterministic.
In the first place, we can always resort to the compatibilism theory, supported by philosophers like Hume and Hobbes. Hobbes states that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive. He does so by redefining free will: "Free will is the unencumbered ability of an agent to do what she wants" (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007). A person might decide to do something out of his volition, without being pressed into it by an exterior agent. In the case where, say, a man puts a gun on the agent's head to perform an action, that would be a clear case of lack of free will. But in the case where the agent says "I can, but I won't", that would be considered free will in Hobbes's definition. We can see from this definition that any machine can be said to have free will, even basic machinery that do not try to imitate the human mind. But that is not the solution that we are looking for, since we are trying to show that the free will that pertains to the human mind, and not to simple machines, still exists when virtualized into a machine.
In order to do that, we'll have to go back to Alan Turing. He was extremely interested in the burgeoning field of quantum mechanics. in 1951, Turing was a guest on BBC Talk where he invoked the idea that a Turing Machine’s output should in principle be predicted by calculation, but a way around the limitation could be found using quantum mechanics, as related by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
"Turing [, on the BBC Talk show,] is discussing the possibility that, when seen as a quantum-mechanical machine rather than a classical machine, the Turing machine model is inadequate. The correct connection to draw is not with Turing's 1938 work on ordinal logics, but with his knowledge of quantum mechanics from Eddington and von Neumann in his youth. Indeed, in an early speculation, influenced by Eddington, Turing had suggested that quantum mechanical physics could yield the basis of free-will (Hodges 1983, p. 63). Von Neumann's axioms of quantum mechanics involve two processes: unitary evolution of the wave function, which is predictable, and the measurement or reduction operation, which introduces unpredictability. Turing's reference to unpredictability must therefore refer to the reduction process."
It is entirely possible that our own minds behave in a quantum fashion, which gives rise to some aspect of our consciousness, granting us our free will. Were we to replicate these quantum phenomena in our simulations, we would keep the same amount of free will as we do in our biological bodies (as it is always possible that we do not possess free will in the first place). While the evidence is not absolutely conclusive, it is definitely worth a second glance from perpetrators of the strong deterministic point of view.
c. Ethical Implications of Simulations
In
Goertzel and Bugaj relate a conversation between the Dalai Lama and systems theorist Francisco Varela (and two of his colleagues,
Hayward: Does Your Holiness regard it as a definite criterion that there must be continuity with some prior consciousness that whenever there is a cognition, there must have been a stream of cognition going back to beginningless time?
Dalai Lama: There is no possibility for a new cognition, which has no relationship to a previous continuum, to arise at all. I can't totally rule out the possibility that, if all the external conditions and the karmic action were there, a stream of consciousness might actually enter into a computer.
Dalai Lama: Yes, that's right. [Dalai Lama laughs] There is a possibility that a scientist who is very much involved his whole life [with computers], then the next life... [would be reborn in a computer], same process! [Laughter] Then this machine which is half-human and half-machine has been reincarnated. (p. 223)
I will not debate the point further, as the actual detailed points should be dealt with when there is a clearer view in what an 'emulated brain' actually results. We have opened our minds to the issues involved and we will be able to look at the upcoming events with better judgement.
IV. Conclusion
After looking at the model of the mind as a machine and the history of its theory, we were able to discern some elements that brought forth some interesting philosophical implications. We understood that it was important to have a philosophical basis for the newly acquired sense of self-identity, we have looked into how an emulated brain would affect our free will and we finally looked into how we should proceed once we have built the emulating machines. From this point on, since an emulated brain would only get faster and more powerful, we should look at the possible repercussions of advanced artificial intelligence (or human-cyborg hybridized intelligence). Mainly, we need to take a look at the possible motives and emergence speed of such intelligence.
Works Cited List
1. Goertzel, Ben and Bugaj, Stephan Vladimir. The Path to Posthumanism. Academica Press,LLC, 2006.
2. Hawkins, Jeff. On Intelligence. Owl Books, 2005.
3. “Turing, Alan” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online. 2007. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing/
4. Turing, Alan. Computing Machinery and Intelligence. 1936 (Manifesto)
Hello All,
Usually, I do not send email after a class has ended. But there are two reasons for this message. I am forwarding what I sent to the faculty members of the philosophy department about some misguided views to which students have been exposed. And I thought it would be helpful if you were informed about the whole issue. Second, two students from PHIL 220 last fall are mentioned there.
All the best for the New Year,
Vesselin Petkov
Dear Colleagues,
Please have a look at the attached article (also enclosed below) about a new mandatory Ethics and Religious Culture (ERC) course. Here are two quotes to have a quick idea about it (in case you have not read the news):
"Canada's National Post has reported on the developing confrontation between educators who have ordered students to take the course and students and their parents who object to what they see as a virtual indoctrination into a social and moral relativism."
"ERC was adopted by virtual fiat, its mission to instill 'normative pluralism' in students. 'Normative pluralism' is gussied-up moral relativism, the ideology asserting there is no absolute right or wrong and that there are as many 'truths' as there are whims."
In my view, these educators are dangerously misguided. I think, it is obvious why - one might argue that governments can much easier manipulate a society the majority of whose members live in a fantasy world where anything goes - no one is right and no one is wrong. Fortunately, science and engineering students laugh at such views and even suggest questions that those who share them should be asked.
The specific reason for sending it to you is that we might have to deal with students indoctrinated with such views. That course is officially a new one, but I suspect and also (like perhaps some of you) have information that students have been exposed to such ideas at least for some years.
However, I know one thing with certainty - in the last several years I was surprised to have students who often aggressively defended such relativism. What is most disturbing is that they are helpless - they cannot defend their position. When asked to support a claim with arguments most often they look confused and just make another unsupported claim. What irritates them the most is when I explain the fact that there is no democracy in science telling them, for example, that in 1916 Einstein was alone against the whole world when he argued that gravity was a manifestation of the curvature of spacetime, not a force; and the ultimate judge - the experimental evidence - ruled against the whole world (the ultimate judge and the experimental evidence are especially hated by such students).
In previous years I met such students only in the Liberal Arts College (initially, rarely one in a class). But last semester there were two students in PHIL 220 who claimed in the student evaluations I did not allow different opinions. This amazing claim, which is the opposite of the actual situation, is another example of how dangerous that relativism is - for these students even facts are relative. At least several times in every class I was urging all in class to ask questions and to raise objections to the issues we discussed. Also, when arguing against a given view, especially against that dangerous relativism, I was telling them: "Do not trust what I try to convince you, but do not trust anybody else either. Use your own brains to arrive at a well-supported opinion." I wonder whether one can act in a more fair way, but even this did not prevent them from relativizing the facts.
I believe such relativism should be confronted at least in the University. The very fact that such students try to apply it to philosophy of science and even to science demonstrates, in my view, how serious the issue is. I would not be surprised if they believe, for example, that the Canadian Parliament can vote to eliminate gravity or, more in line with that dangerous relativism, that everyone is free to decide whether or not gravity exists. Such views should be dealt with properly at the University since they are both self-contradictory (those who share them do take into account the existence of gravity, for example, or the existence of the courts of justice) and intellectually dangerous and unfair.
Best regards,
Vesselin Petkov
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Monday, December 22, 2008
BRAVE NEW SCHOOLS
WorldNetDaily
7 students suspended for refusing anti-Christian class
Officials are 'veering into creepy Orwellian political territory here'
Posted: December 20, 2008, 12:30 am Eastern
Seven Christian students in Quebec have been handed suspensions in the last few days - and could face expulsions - for refusing to participate in a new mandatory Ethics and Religious Culture course that, according to a critic, is a "superficial mishmash of trendy theoretical platitudes" with the goal of convincing children that "all religions - including pagan animism and cults - are equally 'true.'"
Canada's National Post has reported on the developing confrontation between educators who have ordered students to take the course and students and their parents who object to what they see as a virtual indoctrination into a social and moral relativism.
While seven students already have been targeted for punishment, hundreds more are demanding to be relieved of the obligation to attend the classes, and several parents have begun legal actions over the course.
Diane Gagne's 16-year-old son, Jonathan, is one of those hit with a suspension. He has refused to take part in the two-hour-per-week course because it teaches values that run counter to his religious beliefs.
"He told me, 'Mom, I am still standing, and I'm going to keep standing and fight this to the end,'" said Diane Gagne. "We're prepared to go right to expulsion."
Lawyer Jean-Yves Cote is representing the family against the suspension imposed by the public high school in Granby, Quebec, as well as another family with a court challenge to the state demand.
Under the course requirements, "it is the state deciding what religious content will be learned, at what age, and that is totally overriding the parents' authority and role," Jean Morse-Chevrier, of the Quebec Association of Catholic Parents, told the newspaper.
In 2005, a change in the law eliminated a family's right to choose among "Catholic," "Protestant" or "moral" instruction in classrooms, a change that took effect last summer.
Quebec Education Department spokeswoman Stephanie Tremblay told the newspaper school boards have gotten more than 1,400 requests from parents for their children to be exempted from the instruction, which emphasizes feminism over Christianity, and suggests Raelians are centuries ahead of other beliefs.
She also confirmed school boards have rejected every request for an exemption.
She explained it is not "religious instruction."
"It is religious culture," she stated. "We introduce young people to religious culture like we introduce them to musical culture."
Officials at Voice of the Martyrs, who work daily against persecution of Christians worldwide, noted on a blog posting the students are to be applauded for their opposition to state religious teaching.
"We believe that the state has no right to mandate religious education, force students to learn the content of other religious and to deliberately seek to undermine the religious convictions of those who refuse to accept a relativistic view of truth. It is the right and responsibility of parents to train their own children according to their own religious beliefs, not those of the state," said the posting.
"Religious courses, if offered, should be optional or alternatives provided. But the state must not mandate what religious content will or will not be taught to children, especially against the wishes of their parents."
In the National Post, columnist Barbara Kay took school officials to task for teaching what she described as "a chilling intrusion into what all democratically inspired charters of rights designate as a parental realm of authority."
She continued, "ERC was adopted by virtual fiat, its mission to instill 'normative pluralism' in students. 'Normative pluralism' is gussied-up moral relativism, the ideology asserting there is no absolute right or wrong and that there are as many 'truths' as there are whims."
"The program is predicated on the worst worst possible educational model for young children: the philosopher Hegel's 'pedagogy of conflict.' As one of the founders of the ECR course put it, students 'must learn to shake up a too-solid identity' and experience 'divergence and dissonance'.
"The curriculum is strewn with politically correct material that openly subverts Judeo-Christian values. In many of the manuals, ideology and religion are conflated. Social engineering is revealed as the heart of the ECR program; in the most recently published activity book, for example, Christianity is given 12 pages, feminism gets 27 pages...."
She continued, "Paganism and cults are offered equal status with Christianity. Witches 'are women like any other in daily life;' 'Technologically [the Raelians] are 25,000 years in advance of us.' And considering that of the 80,000 ethnic aboriginals in Quebec only 700 self-identify with aboriginal spirituality (the vast majority of ethnic aboriginals are Christian), aboriginal spirituality (falsely equated with environmentalism) is accorded hugely disproportionate space and reverence."
Cote said the issue could end up before the Supreme Court of Canada soon. He said his second case, in Drummondville, is to be heard before Superior Court in May, and will test if the course infringes guaranteed rights in Canada.
Since the course is required for all students, not just public school students, 600 of the students at Montreal's Jesuit Loyola High asked for exemptions and all were rejected.
Now the school has started its own court challenge. Principal Paul Donovan told the Post the mandates require relativism.
"What it essentially says is that religion is just, 'You like tomato soup and I like pea soup, so don't be all offended because someone likes tomato soup. It's really just a matter of preference,'" he told the Post. "Religion could be Wiccan or Raelian or any of the new movements or atheism or agnosticism."
Sylvain Lamontagne told the Globe Campus education publication the course is religious fast food.
"We can't do this to children. It will only confuse them," he said. "Religion isn't a Chinese buffet. You can't just pick one and then another however you want."
Kay cited the course's "gloss" of the Golden Rule:
"Christianity's 'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,' Judaism's 'Love thy neighbour as thyself ' and Islam's 'None of you is really a believer if he does not wish for his brother what he wishes for himself.' All are posited in the ERC text as the same acknowledgement of the common humanity of all God's children," she wrote.
"But in fact, there is a deep interpretive chasm between Christianity's 'others' and Judaism's 'neighbour' - both of which refer to all people - and Islam's 'brother,' which refers only to fellow Muslims. Here is 'divergence and dissonance' truly worthy of 'le questionnement.' But encouraging real critical thinking is precisely what the ERC course employs duplicity to avoid," she wrote.
"Quebec is veering into creepy Orwellian political territory here," she said.
The government requirement for teaching a potpourri of religious concepts as equal is just the latest effort on the part of the Canadian government to put new restrictions on Christians.
WND previously has reported on a number of Human Rights Commission cases in the nation that have targeted Christian pastors and others for "hate" crimes for stating their biblically-based opposition to the homosexual lifestyle.
Last spring, Pastor Stephen Boisson was ordered by the Alberta Human Rights Tribunal to stop expressing his biblical perspective of homosexuality and pay $5,000 for "damages for pain and suffering" as well as apologize to the activist who complained of being hurt.
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