The Humanity in Evolutionarily Derived Proof-Seeking Systems

I've been wondering lately about the limitation of evolutionarily derived systems of the following sort: Taking a pool of already-proved theorems, a "primordial soup" of proof systems are built with only the most rudimentary basics of arithmetic (perhaps even before a Godel incomplete system), and pick off the systems that prove the least amount of theorems in each generation and promoting the reproduction on the best systems of each generation. If we allow for many sorts of duplication as well, such as exact copies, mutations, mergings and branchings, we are left with systems that encompass more and more theorems. We have here an evolutionary system: there is reproduction, mutation and selective pressure.

The question is not whether such systems would ever be succesful at opening up new truths for mathematics, but rather to look at the sort of system that could possibly survive in this environment. There would be the expected systems, that rigidly keeps faith to the laws of mathematics as we understand them, and these are the ones we would hope would open new doors for us. On the other end of the scale, we have those that barely scrape off the last percentile to survive, and we expect those to probably die off in a few generations. The kind that is of interest to us is the is able to keep a solid foundation of mathematics as the first kind did, but also allows certain proofs to be proved at the expense of other proofs. What we'd find in these systems is a system that could perhaps disregard or extend fundamental theorems so that a larger number of theorems are proved. Such a system would be able to prove many "surface" theorems, but would be fundamentally flawed. I believe we would have here something similar to phlogistons, the element in fire thought by the ancient greeks to be present in combustile matter. It had explanatory and predictive power, but was later found out to be fundamentally flawed. Such system could potentially compartimentalize most of its theorems so that some rules it has applies to some theorems, and some other rules apply to others.

Now, you might ask, "But if the pool of theorems is only based on theorems we know, wouldn't the whole idea favor systems that are most like the ones we already have?" It would certainly be that way, but that is not the purpose of the thought experiment. We are not trying to find the "truest" system, but only the sort of system that could be built from it. The fundamentally flawed systems are systems that are most able to "work in their environment" without ascribing to fundamentally correct or coherent behaviour. It is simply trying to do the best in the situation it is in, without regard to any fully teleological bottom-up approach.

The question is, how far off from this sort of system is a human being in its environment? It would seem at first glance that humans, unlike the proof-seeking systems, do have a teleological approach to our environment. But it hasn't always been that way. The first multi-cellular beings had no such approach, they responded as our systems do, simply trying to optimize the results for the given requirements. As we move along the evolutionary spectrum, we start leaving these 'deterministic' approaches and arrive at a time where the information by the beings can be analysed and used to judge other information and to promote actions. But there remains the nagging fact that there are vestiges of such evolution (compartimentalization, emotions and reflexes are all ways to circumvent the bottom-up approach of teleology) and I wonder whether there are fundamental flaws in our reasonings, but we have circumventions used to avoid them without being aware of it, because it was more favorable that we did not think this way.

Kant's Teleology of Nature in light of Evolution by Natural Selection

This is a paper I wrote for my Philosophy of Aesthetics class concerning Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment.

Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment is the third book of his analysis of our faculty to reason, focusing mainly on the aesthetical and teleological faculties of the mind. In speaking of teleology, he posits a system of nature on which we are able to judge based on its purposiveness. This paper proposes that the system of nature which Kant describes mirrors in its teleological aspects the system of natural selection which is currently being used in the biological paradigm; This system consists of organisms are formed, survive and reproduce using cells, DNA and their environment. The specifics of these mechanisms will be described in the paper using Richard Dawkins' The Selfish Gene in which he outlines the contemporary fundamentals of natural selection. First, we will establish the framework in which we will intersect the two theories, then analyse the similarities in terms of purposiveness.

First, it will be important to cover the grounds which will be used to discuss the similarities between Kant's system and the evolutionary system. Kant discusses the system of nature as a system in which organised systems (organisms) behave in a fashion that is different from non-living systems: they seem to be formed purposefully, as if they had a goal in their design and behaviour. (p.233-234, Kant) Kant relinquishes this teleological judgment as reflective-- the particular concept is given and the universal has to be found from it. In this vein, Kant sets living systems at the center of his natural system. (p.233-234 Kant) Natural selection, on the other hand, while putting perhaps more emphasis on the organisms themselves, also sets importance to the environment in which they are placed. It will be made clear when covering the purposiveness of nature how it impacts the nature of our teleological judgments.
Kant posits an antimony between the explanatory power of mechanical laws and its limits, in view that it did not seem possible at the time to explain the emergence of living from non-living matter. Part of Kant's solution is based in the claim that both principles are regulative and not constitutive, they do not state how nature really is, but presents principles of investigation of nature. This is due to peculiarities in human cognition. "discursive" understanding contrasts with "intuitive" understanding. We intuitively understand that the production of organisms is impossible without teleological causation. The only possible resolution would be "subordinate" mechanism to teleology. Higher species come from lower species, but it would be impossible for lower species to come from unorganized matter. That point where we lack a mechanistic explanation, we let go to teleology, becoming the starting point for our investigation. Alway s in the case of organisms, the "mechanism" depends on living matter, whose possibility we can understand only in teleological terms.
With the venue of natural selection and the genetical system at its foundation, it has become possible to begin to settle this antimony by understanding the automation involved in biological organisms (that is, systems of DNA, rNA and epigenetics). While we do not know exactly how it has come to be, the answer is already clear enough to see that it is more than "because it was its goal to." Dawkins explains this eloquently when he says, "Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is satisfying because it shows us a way in which simplicity could change into complexity, how unordered atoms could group themselves into ever more complex patterns until they ended up manufacturing people." (p.12, Dawkins)
One more point that we should be wary of is that of language. Daniel Denett, a prominent philosopher and biologist, explains in his paper "The Intentional Stance" that it is possible to speak of a system in terms of intentionality without actually referring to an intentionality in the system itself. He uses the example of a chess computer which would appear to act as though it were working toward a certain goal (i.e. moving into a checkmate and so on), even though we are fully aware that a computer chess does not in fact follow such teleological trains of thought. (Dennett, "The Intentional Stance") It remains possible to speak of a system with the language we use for our own intentionality when the object itself behaves as if it were designed. This is seen in natural systems, since the selection portion of the system makes the objects within the system seem to be designed toward a certain goal-- that is, survival. It is important to notice that this abstraction of language does not render the concepts subjective. They rather translate the objective character of the mechanics so as only to speak of their function in terms of purposiveness (or intentionality, in Denett's case.)
It is important to bring a historical light to his issue to understand where the first ideas of natural selection came into being and how they could have influenced Kant. Kant lived approximately fifty years after the Compte de Buffon (one of Charles Darwin's inspirations) and Maupertuis (who did research on heredity), considered to be ones of the first pioneers in terms of the natural selection theory, before Charles Darwin concretised it after Kant's death. It is not completely inconsistent to see that Kant did not exist in a complete vacuum of philosophical thought, but was also influenced by the various currents of his times.
Therefore, it should become easier from here on out to analyse the theories and imagine how Kant's organisms are mirrored in the organisms that genes have formed in the theory of natural selection, and to see their roles (and mechanisms) as part of Kant's apparent purposiveness of nature.

Kant makes a distinction between two sorts of purposiveness: formal and material. The formal purposiveness is the conceptual type. If we are to imagine a circle and ground it in our mind in an arbitrary space and from there deduce the limits and "laws" that are enclosed in it, we are merely dealing with an unreal concept which we use to ground other material (empirical) concepts. This concept shows us how a priori knowledge about the world points to us a certain purposiveness to nature. (p.236, Kant) This has important ramifications for such things as rationality and subjectivity. If all humans are able to see these laws in circles, then surely there must be some objective ground for supposing so. A possible solution to this problem comes from Daniel Dennett's paper "Rational Systems" in which he explains that any rational system evolving through a system of natural selection must always be selecting individual systems which reinforce a certain mirroring of the external world. Such a system would ensure that the organism has a "true" representation of the world, at least as far as it fulfills its needs. (Daniel Dennett, "Rational Systems") From this, it would seem that this a priori knowledge shown through conceptual judgments is necessary for any complex enough organism, and would root the claim of objectivity in these particular instances.
Kant had also reached the same conclusion, but had been settled in terms of self-evidence in the following passage,

"All geometrical figures that are drawn in accordance with a principle may display a manifold and often admired objective purposiveness, namely that of serviceability for the solution of many problems in accordance with a single principle, and indeed of each of them in infinitely many different ways. The purposiveness here is evidently objective and intellectual, not, however, merely subjective and aesthetic. For it expresses the suitability of the figure for the generations of many shapes aimed at purposes, and is cognized through reason." (p. 235, Kant)

Kant believes that the principle of nature's purposiveness are based on nature's empirical lawlikeness (mirrored in the formal lawlikeness). If the objects of nature are conceptualizable, then those empirical regularities must be recognized as law-like, and falling into a systematic hierarchy. This systematic hierarchy seems to fit the concept of biological evolution. The system of natural selection realizes organisms that have the effect of seeming to be designed, to have a purposiveness that is causal to their existence, since another "design" would select them out of nature, leaving only the organisms that fit into nature's unified system.
Kant further speaks of the question of possibility by saying, "But the purposiveness still does not make the concept of the object itself possible, i.e., it is not regarded as possible merely with respect to this use." (p.235, Kant) Kant believes that the reflecting judgment is anchored in the fact that we cannot judge the possibility of the objects of nature through teleological judgments. The same remains true for certain judgments in the evolutionary view, though at a different degree. With the knowledge gained from the contemporary paradigm, we have a much more precise knowledge of the possibilities of the organisms' forms, and to judge the likeness of each. The coupling of certain genes could help an organism' survival and maintain its species for a longer amount of time. (Dawkins, p.88) Such judgments come into account when judging the likelihood of certain types of natural organisms to a degree that moves a large set of possibilities into the determining realm. Of course, certain possibilities remain out of our grasp and rely still on our reflective judgments.
The position of man within this system has been set by Kant as the ultimate recipient of the "purpose of nature" (or its ultimate end). Kant saw man as being outside of this system of nature and the purpose of it since man is the only being which is able to freely choose its own end (he is able to understand the morality of his own actions outside of his own impulses.) When it comes to evolutionary theory, we see that man only becomes one end of a self-conscious spectrum in which other animals may also have claim. There are primates who exhibit complex social structures and mores that could indicate complex thought on par with the sort of moral thought humans are able to cognate. As for the final end of nature, the inner purposiveness of nature itself, natural selection allows us to see it much more clearly through evolutionary pressures in the system, allowing for the emergence of social mores and sympathy, to see that its own inner purposiveness is based on the survival of types of organisms.

In conclusion, this paper has set the ground for a framework in which we are able to reconcile Kant's view of the system of nature to the explanatory power of evolution by natural selection. As Kant believed, humans have the potential to freely choose their ends, and as such, it becomes imperative to understand which we choose, as our knowledge of biology augments to the point where we become the designers of nature, and the organisms within it.

Works Cited

1. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Print.
2. Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene (The 30th Anniversary Collection). Oxford University Press, 2006.
3. Dennett, Daniel. "The Intentional Stance". Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1987.
4. Dennett, Daniel. Brainstorms: philosophical essays on Mind and Psychology. "Rational Systems." Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1981.

actions author brain case change comments computer consciousness course example fact free god human idea immutability implications intelligence intentional knowledge looking machine mind model object order people perfection person philosophical philosophy point possible post power process real reality relation relativism religious something state students system thinking turing view virtual world

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Defense Against Dualism

How do you account for the fact that consciousness is also relative to the motion of the brain? An astronaut going many times faster relative to us would be thinking as fast as us subjectively, but when comparing from our motions relative to each other, we are the ones thinking quite faster, since time is slower for the astronaut. If our mind is detached from the physical world, how come the astronaut doesn't think much slower than we do?

At The Club

The discoball reflected rays of orange and green, flashes of hands and
boobs on the dancefloor. I sit motionless through the trombes of sweat
engines, if my heart were to stop right this moment, it would be
brought back to life by the vibrations of the bass against my chest. A
woman stops to dance in front of me, but I'm too numb to care, an orgy
of pheromones dance within the room and nobody seems to care.
Everybody's too in the moment to notice the raging storm outside. Only
the occasional cold brush against someone who just came from a
cigarette remind you that not everybodys stuck to the beat. Not
everybody can lose themselves to the music, sometimes you can't lose
yourself. Because you don't even know that you have something to lose.
It occurs to me from time to time that I might spend my time to better
use, that I could do something of myself. What does that even mean?
The thought passed quickly and I find myself attracted to the beat
once more. Attracted to this flow of people who all seem to have read
this social contract, I search in vain for a copy but fall short of
finding that connection. I find myself swimming in a sea of people,
drowning in the interactions of beautiful men and women who either
know something I don't or are simply joined in by this lack of
knowledge. Maybe I want to be like them, maybe I just want them to be
like me. Can talk the talk, but can't walk the walk in the realm of
noise. My brain feels tight, I try to smile but all that comes out is
a faint outline of a grin. Comedy through exageration, shields other
from my true emotions, can't tell them what I know, can't break their
fun.

Sent from my iPhone

To the introverted

I was thinking about what an introverted person need to do in order to get out into the world and reap the fruits of their social environment (although this could also apply to the extroverted as well.) It seems that the best approach in these matters would be a seed-planting method. To place small seeds in the community and see if it blooms into something. For example, talking to some random person in class, help a person out in the streets, make a joke to your waitress. The point is that you never know what the consequences will be. For all you know, this person can be your next best friend, your new lover or your mentor. Not only that, but it could be one of their acquaintances that is the person that you are looking for. Plants seeds and see how they fare, make sure you water them every now and then. Be sure to do this as often as you can, for when you plant seeds, you don't plant one and wait, you plant many so as to be sure to get at least one.

It might also be that you are someone that one of your seeds (or acquaintance of) is looking for. Don't wait until they come to you, plant the seeds of Good and Friendship and something will surely grow eventually. It's all in the way you look at things and less the way things (or, you know, people) look at you.

So go out and plant those seeds, see how it goes. What do you have to lose?

Disconnexia

Disconnexia is the complex brought about by the feeling of uneasiness you get when you do not feel connected to the world. The feeling you get when you forget to bring your cellphone or turn on MSN. This feeling gets more and more powerful as technology progresses towards a breaking of the link between social circles and location.